Little information has previously been revealed about the buyers of publicly
auctioned patents. While the auctioned patents have been analyzed, and the
sellers reasonably scrutinized, the buyers have remained somewhat of a mystery.
Our latest report aims to fill that void by providing information about the buyers,
both individually and as a group, of some 300 patent lots offered at nine Ocean
Tomo patent auctions from Spring 2006-Spring 2009. This 225-page report also
describes the evolving nature of public patent auctions and what their success says
about open innovation in the knowledge economy.
By categorizing the buyers into various groupings, we are able to provide increased
granularity with respect to purchase prices at these professionally conducted auctions than
appears to have been previously reported. Intellectual Ventures paid more than $60 million
for the lots having published pricing data, with the non-IV buyers paying some $20 million
for those lots having published pricing data. Our research indicates that the operating
company buyers, while few in number, tend to have paid the most per lot.
Our research confirms the rumors that Intellectual Ventures purchased the lion’s share of
patents sold at the Ocean Tomo auctions. We found that IV appears to have purchased
some 76% of the lots sold, with the remaining 24% split about equally between other non-
practicing entities and operating companies.
In a broader context, we also examine the role of patent auctions in the knowledge
economy and what the “success” of these auctions says about open innovation business
strategies. The research provided here should be of interest not only to IP practitioners
but also to legal and economic researchers as well.
Our research also debunks the common myth that IV acquired most of its patents via
auctions, as we find that the patents acquired likely amount to no more than 7% of the
Bellevue-based company’s total portfolio. The report further debunks the often repeated
rumor that Intellectual Ventures spends no more than $40,000 per patent.
This publication marks the first of our executive series based upon data enhanced from our
“The Intellectual Ventures Portfolio In the United States: Patents & Applications (2nd
Edition, 2010).” This report has recently been mentioned in both the New York Times and
Dow Jones Newswires. Our research here adds new patent shells and additional patents to
those identified in our ground-breaking report.
auctioned patents. While the auctioned patents have been analyzed, and the
sellers reasonably scrutinized, the buyers have remained somewhat of a mystery.
Our latest report aims to fill that void by providing information about the buyers,
both individually and as a group, of some 300 patent lots offered at nine Ocean
Tomo patent auctions from Spring 2006-Spring 2009. This 225-page report also
describes the evolving nature of public patent auctions and what their success says
about open innovation in the knowledge economy.
By categorizing the buyers into various groupings, we are able to provide increased
granularity with respect to purchase prices at these professionally conducted auctions than
appears to have been previously reported. Intellectual Ventures paid more than $60 million
for the lots having published pricing data, with the non-IV buyers paying some $20 million
for those lots having published pricing data. Our research indicates that the operating
company buyers, while few in number, tend to have paid the most per lot.
Our research confirms the rumors that Intellectual Ventures purchased the lion’s share of
patents sold at the Ocean Tomo auctions. We found that IV appears to have purchased
some 76% of the lots sold, with the remaining 24% split about equally between other non-
practicing entities and operating companies.
In a broader context, we also examine the role of patent auctions in the knowledge
economy and what the “success” of these auctions says about open innovation business
strategies. The research provided here should be of interest not only to IP practitioners
but also to legal and economic researchers as well.
Our research also debunks the common myth that IV acquired most of its patents via
auctions, as we find that the patents acquired likely amount to no more than 7% of the
Bellevue-based company’s total portfolio. The report further debunks the often repeated
rumor that Intellectual Ventures spends no more than $40,000 per patent.
This publication marks the first of our executive series based upon data enhanced from our
“The Intellectual Ventures Portfolio In the United States: Patents & Applications (2nd
Edition, 2010).” This report has recently been mentioned in both the New York Times and
Dow Jones Newswires. Our research here adds new patent shells and additional patents to
those identified in our ground-breaking report.
(c) 2010 Avancept LLC, All Rights Reserved
| Publicly Auctioned Patent Buyers: Intellectual Ventures & Others |
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Executive Summary
I. Public Auctions, Open Innovation & the Knowledge Economy
II. The Genesis & Evolution of Public Patent Auctions
A. Overview
B. The Genesis of the Public Patent Auction
C. The Evolution of the Patent Auction Format
D. Intrinsic Impediments to Public Sales of Patents
E. The Non-IV Buyers and the “Failure” of the Spring 2009 Auction
III. The Buyers
A. The Non-IV Buyers
1. The Operating Companies
2. The Non-Practicing Entities
B. Intellectual Ventures
IV. Buyers and Auction Prices
V. Our Methodology
A. Methodology Overview
B. The Significance of Patent Office Recordation Data
C. Searching Methodologies
1. Corporate Similarities
2. Patent Prosecution Similarities
D. Some Findings By Applying the Methodology
VI. Conclusion
I. Public Auctions, Open Innovation & the Knowledge Economy
II. The Genesis & Evolution of Public Patent Auctions
A. Overview
B. The Genesis of the Public Patent Auction
C. The Evolution of the Patent Auction Format
D. Intrinsic Impediments to Public Sales of Patents
E. The Non-IV Buyers and the “Failure” of the Spring 2009 Auction
III. The Buyers
A. The Non-IV Buyers
1. The Operating Companies
2. The Non-Practicing Entities
B. Intellectual Ventures
IV. Buyers and Auction Prices
V. Our Methodology
A. Methodology Overview
B. The Significance of Patent Office Recordation Data
C. Searching Methodologies
1. Corporate Similarities
2. Patent Prosecution Similarities
D. Some Findings By Applying the Methodology
VI. Conclusion
Outline
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